Briefing 59 - October 1992
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1. REPROCESSING WORK TO INCREASE

1.1. The final transformation of Dounreay from a research centre for fast 
reactors into a fully commercial reprocessing operation is now underway.  
Dounreay has responded to the UK Government's decision definitely to 
close its PFR fast reactor in 1994 with the start of an aggressive campaign to 
increase its reprocessing work. 

1.1.2. The Government is also understood to be considering the final steps to 
sell Dounreay, and the other AEA Technology sites,to private business. 
 AEA Technology already has to operate under business financial principles 
and its full privatisation was supported in a Government report earlier this
 year. AEA Technology is likely to be privatised as part of the Government's
 review of the UK nuclear industry in 1994.

1.2. To understand Dounreay's position it is important to remember it has 
two reprocessing plants.  

1.2.1. The MTR reprocessing plant is used for research reactor fuel 
and is the plant used to reprocess the fuel transported from Germany, 
for example, over the past two years.  

1.2.2. There is a market for this work because the traditional reprocessor, 
the USA, has refused to carry out the work since December 1988 because 
of environmental concerns.

1.2.3. Dounreay's initial hopes to build up dozens of contracts for storing 
and reprocessing research reactor fuel have failed to materialise for a number 
of reasons.  Dounreay's contracts are expensive and this discourages reactor 
operators, who will choose storage as the cheaper option if this is possible.  
National and international opposition to the transportation of spent fuel to 
Dounreay has also caused problems and several countries have rejected 
contracts with Dounreay because of international protests.

1.2.4. Dounreay claims it has signed only nine reprocessing contracts for 
foreign research reactor fuel and senior management has warned that a 
"purely commercial" decision on the plant's future will have to be taken
 next month. If no more contracts are signed it is possible the MTR 
plant will have to close next year once contracts are fulfilled.

1.2.5. The oxide reprocessing plant was built to process the fuel from 
Dounreay's fast reactor.  Now this is definitely closing AEA Technology 
is desperately looking for more reprocessing work to keep this plant 
open and already has some contracts.

1.2.6. AEA Technology is asking the UK Government to re-structure payment of its 
remaining funding for the oxide reprocessing plant.The Government 
has said it will provide money for the plant until 1997.  Dounreay wants this money 
spread over a further six years, until 2003.  This would allow Dounreay more time 
to build up new reprocessing work and to combine reprocessing the last fuel from 
the fast reactor with commercial contracts.

1.3.  Dounreay hopes the two reprocessing plants will keep up to 600 people 
employed at Dounreay.  Several hundred more people will be employed in 
decommissioning radioactive buildings. Decommissioning work on the 
PFR, and the original Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR), closed in 1977 
(See 56.5.1.), will become a major part of the site's activities during the 
1990s, with average annual costs of between at least UK£40-50 million.

2. OTHER DOUNREAY NEWS

2.1. For the first time spent irradiated fuel has been shipped direct to 
Dounreay's local port, Scrabster. Until last month spent fuel was sent to 
Dounreay by road and rail. 

2.1.1. Two flask containing 26 fuel elements from the Graching research 
reactor in Munich were loaded at Bremerhaven onto the roll-on/roll-off cargo 
vessel Arcturus.  This is a general cargo vessel which regularly calls at German 
and English ports.  The flasks were apparently the only cargo on the vessel 
which left Bremerhaven on 19th September, travelling across the North 
Sea and through the Pentland Firth to Scrabster.  

2.1.2. The Arcturus arrived on Monday 21st September and tied up at the 
ferry terminal owned by P & O Ferries and also used by the Faroese 
ferry Smyril. 

2.1.3. It is possible future shipments of spent fuel for Dounreay will use 
the same route.  Scrabster is used not only by the Smyril but also by many
 fishing vessels from Shetland, Iceland and Faroe. There will be concern 
in the fishing industry if the port is to be used regularly for shipments of
 highly hazardous nuclear cargoes.

2.2. Details of the extraordinary cocktail of radioactive waste dumped 
in a shaft in the ground have emerged following a parliamentary question 
by Labour MP, Mr Doug Hoyle.  

2.2.1. The shaft was dug in the 1950s to provide access to Dounreay 
disposal tunnel which takes liquid waste out to sea.  The shaft was used 
until 1977 for dumping solid waste.  According to Mr John Maltby,
 chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, the shaft contains:
"about 100 kgs of uranium, a small quantity of plutonium, a few 
hundred tereBecquerels of...strontium-90 and caesium-137 and a 
few teraBecquerels of...cobalt-60 and niobium-94." 
(1 teraBecquerel = 1,000,000,000,000 becquerels = 27 curies)

2.2.2. In total there is "about 800m3" of waste and "a number of heavy
 concrete blocks have been dropped into the shaft...to compress the 
waste", Mr Maltby told Mr Hoyle.  This can hardly help the options 
currently being considered for the long-term management of the waste. 

2.3. The UK's nuclear submarine test PWR reactor at HMS Vulcan, 
next to the Dounreay site and operated by Rolls Royce for the 
Ministry of Defence, was shut down in September.   The reactor was
 the prototype for the UK's submarine reactors and it began 
operating in 1965.

2.3.1. In recent years the reactor has been used as the world's 
only loss of coolant accident test rig.

2.3.2.  HMS Vulcan, which uses Dounreay for all its liquid and solid 
waste disposal and discharge, also has PWR 2, the test reactor for the 
UK's next generation of nuclear submarines.

2.4.  Dounreay's Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) is still shut down for
 repairs.  The reactor was shut in June 1991, only a few months after 
another lengthy closure for repairs, because problems with a filter resulted
 in oil leaking into the 1000 tonnes of liquid sodium used to cool the reactor 
core.  AEA now hopes the reactor can be re-started in January - only 
15 months before it is closed completely on 31st March 1994 when 
government funding ends. (See 58.1.)

2.5. In September the Dounreay operator, AEA Technology, were found 
by the government's Health and Safety Executive to be in breach of safety
 regulations concerning the way they handled and stored hundreds of litres
 of liquid radioactive waste.  

2.5.1. Dounreay has since changed it method of dealing with the liquid waste 
and the Health and Safety Executive is to visit the site to confirm working
 practices now comply with the regulations

3. WASTE DUMPING BAN - FOR ALL BUT FRANCE AND UK

3.1.  The new Paris Convention on preventing marine pollution of the
 north-east Atlantic, which replaces the old Oslo and Paris Conventions,
 was signed in Paris in September and includes a permanent ban on dumping
 radioactive wastes at sea.  This has been accepted by 14 of the 16 
signatories, including the EC.  

3.1.1.  Despite lengthy negotiations for several months on a subject which 
dominated the Ministerial meeting in Paris, both France and the UK refused 
to accept the permanent ban.  Both countries face problems disposing of 
decommissioned nuclear submarines and power stations.

3.2. The eventual compromise forced the UK and France to accept a 
15-year ban, until 2008.  There are then two options: either the 
contracting parties unanimously agree to end the exception for the 
UK and France and include them in the permanent ban (highly unlikely
 unless there is a radical change in policy by both governments); or the 
countries can extend the ban on dumping by the UK and France for a
 further 10 years, to 2018.  A three-quarters vote, is needed to impose 
this extra 10 year ban.

3.2.1.  In addition, every two years from 1997 the UK and France must 
report to a meeting of Ministers steps taken to explore alternative 
land-based options to sea dumping and the results of scientific studies
 on the effects on human health, the marine ecosystems and any interference 
with other legitimate uses of the sea.

3.2.2.  After 25 years, in 2018, the ban on dumping by the UK and France 
would end - although they must produce the scientific evidence to justify sea 
dumping.  It is unclear from the text of the treaty whether this evidence has to 
be accepted by other countries before any dumping could resume.

3.2.3.  While the UK Government can survive even a 25 year ban for 
dumping power stations, because of the time-scale of decommissioning, its 
redundant submarines are a more pressing problem.  The UK will have at least 
10 decommissioned submarines by the 2008 review.   The House of 
Commons Defence Committee has twice stressed the need for a 
decision on disposing of the submarines - and NIREX's problems with its 
proposed underground dump are adding to the pressure. (See 5.7)

3.2.4.  It is also unclear whether the acceptance of a permanent ban by the 
EC in any way undermines the special exception for the two EC states.

3.3.  The acceptance of a permanent ban on radioactive waste dumping in 
the new convention is a major step forward and ensures no dumping for 15 
years at least and most probably 25 years - in addition to the London
 Dumping Convention's voluntary 10-year global  moratorium.  

3.3.1. This will now increase pressure on the LDC at its meeting in
 November to adopt a Danish proposal for a permanent ban.  The 
UK and France will probably be joined by the USA, Japan, and possibly
 Russia in opposing a ban.  

3.4.  Those Governments accepting the Paris Convention's permanent
 ban should be congratulated and encouraged to support a ban by the 
LDC to continue the fight against radioactive pollution. These countries 
are: Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and the EC.

4. NUCLEAR SAFETY EUROPEAN REPORT  

4.1. A report on the environmental effects of the storage, transport and 
reprocessing of spent fuel for the European Parliament has been completed
 by the Welsh Labour MEP, Mr Llewellyn Smith.  The report will be 
considered first by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection.

4.1.1. Mr Smith's report also calls on the European Parliament to challenge 
the Commission's opinion that a country's decision to reprocess or not is 
purely a national concern.   Mr Smith argues:"There may be areas where 
the principle of subsidarity may be applied sensibly: the management of
 radioactive waste and nuclear reprocessing is not one of them."

4.2. The report calls for all spent fuel to be regarded as nuclear waste - 
at present the nuclear industry insists that spent fuel going for reprocessing 
is not waste.  

4.2.1.  The report's other recommendations include: an urgent ban in all
 imports into the EC of spent fuel, which would particularly effect 
Japanese fuel to Sellafield; an environmental audit by the Commission on 
all aspects of fuel cycle alternatives; adoption of tough USA safety tests 
for spent fuel transport flasks; plutonium transport only on purpose-built 
vessels; and an eventual ban on all plutonium transports.

4.2.2. Mr Smith is also calling for all spent fuel and high-level waste
 shipments to be banned from roll-on/roll-off ferries and other ro-ro 
vessels; the adoption of adequate emergency plans throughout the EC.

4.2.3. The need for reprocessing and the proliferation problems it causes 
should be examined by the European Commission who should also report 
on job alternatives for reprocessing workers. 

5. NEWS IN BRIEF

5.1. Iraqi fuel deadlocked: Dounreay's chance of receiving the UN 
contract to reprocess and refabricate Iraq's 36 kgs of irradiated Highly 
Enriched Uranium could be diminishing.  Iraq is refusing to pay for the 
$20m plus contract and also there are huge problems of ownership, 
liability in case of an accident and waste storage - it can't be returned to
 Iraq.  Now Russia's nuclear industry is reported to be interested in taking 
on the contract in its desperation for foreign currency.

5.2. Plutonium ship on its way:  The first shipment of plutonium from Europe 
to Japan is only weeks away.  The Japanese vessel Akatsuki Maru is en
 route for France to load a tonne of plutonium at Cherbourg.  Indonesia,
 Malaysia and Singapore are three more countries to ban the freighter
 from their waters.  The transportation of plutonium and irradiated fuel
 will be discussed later this month by the International Maritime Organisation.

5.3. Swedish power stations shut: Five nuclear reactors in Sweden, at 
Barsebeb, Ringhals and Oskarshamn, have been shut by the country's 
Nuclear Safety Board after serious faults were found in their emergency 
cooling systems.

5.4. Plutonium spill shuts plant: The Sellafield reprocessing plant was
 closed in early September after 20-30 litres of plutonium solution from
 an evaporator at the plant.  The Irish Government has called for a 
detailed report on the accident.

5.5. Sellafield caused my death...: Living close to the Sellafield reprocessing 
plant in north west England as a child may have caused a rare cancer while 
killed a 46-year-old doctor.  The doctor, Charles Clyne, wrote his own 
obituary in which he expressed his concern about Sellafield.

5.6. Sellafield court cases: Two court cases start in England in October
 in which parents of children who have cancer are demanding damages 
from the Sellafield operators, British Nuclear Fuel.   The parents blame
 radiation from the plant for the cancers.

5.7. Further delays for NIREX: The UK government agency responsible
 for nuclear waste disposal, NIREX, has announced further delays in 
plans for a deep underground repository at the Sellafield nuclear site.   
NIREX have now abandoned plans to seek permission for the repository 
in the face of serious criticism.  Now NIREX hopes to get permission to 
build a laboratory 800 metres underground as the only way they know of 
testing the geology and water movement of the site.

5.8. Swiss contract for BNF-AEA fuel: The AEA Technology- British
 Nuclear Fuel plant at Sellafield for manufacturing Mix Oxide fuel (MOX) 
has won a contract to supply 28 assemblies for a Swiss PWR reactor.  
MOX fuel is a mixture of uranium and plutonium and is an attempt to find 
a use for some of the plutonium produced by reprocessing spent fuel.
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