Damning Reports on Sellafield

The following reports have been gathered from various sources about the reports by the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), published on Friday 18th February 2000 on British Nuclear Fuels and the Sellafield reprocessing plant. The reports concerned (1) The scandal of false quality data for plutonium fuel; (2) A safety audit of the plant; (3) BNFL's failure to deal with high-level waste at Sellafield.

HSE TEAM INSPECTION OF THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF OPERATIONS AT BNFL's SELLAFIELD SITE

FOREWORD

This report sets out the findings of a multidisciplinary team inspection
carried out by HSE into the control and supervision of operations at BNFL's
site at Sellafield.

The investigation was carried out under the control of the Deputy Chief
Inspector of HSE's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate who is responsible for
regulating safety at BNFL's sites. The inspection was carried out between 6
and 27 September 1999. HSE's team consisted of 11 nuclear inspectors and 2
inspectors from its Field Operations Directorate together with
administrative staff.

The inspection was requested by the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations
following a series of events at Sellafield where the cause was seen to be
weaknesses in control and supervision.

The team found that there were indeed weaknesses in this area and has made
recommendations to overcome them. BNFL had also recognised shortfalls in the
company's performance and had introduced initiatives to correct the
shortfalls.

The weaknesses found showed that there had been a deterioration in safety
performance at Sellafield. The recommendations identified in this report are
those which BNFL needs to implement to fully meet the standards that are
expected of a nuclear site licensee. Sellafield is not unsafe, but strong
management action is needed to ensure that it both remains safe into the
future and that BNFL makes the practicable improvements which can reasonably
be expected.

NII has required BNFL to produce a programme for responding within 2 months
to the recommendations of this report. Progress will be monitored as part of
NII's normal process of regulation. Should progress be inadequate, NII will
not hesitate to use its enforcement powers.

If you have any comments, or would like further information on the issues
discussed in this report, write to the Chief Inspector at the address below:

Laurence Williams
Director of Nuclear Safety and
HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations
Health and Safety Executive
St Peter's House
Stanley Precinct
Bootle L20 3LZ

The BNFL Sellafield Site located in Cumbria contains two types of nuclear
installations. Four Magnox type reactors provide steam and electricity for
the Sellafield site and supply electricity to the national grid. The
remainder of the site, comprising several hundred buildings, is associated
with the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the treatment and storage of
radioactive wastes. The team inspection described in this report was carried
out on the facilities associated with reprocessing and waste treatment and
storage.

During the first half of 1999, an apparent increase in the number of
incidents occurring at Sellafield was detected by NII. Investigation of some
of these events by the NII inspection team for Sellafield indicated that
inadequacies in BNFL's arrangements for the control and supervision of
operations appeared to be a significant contributor to the poor safety
performance. The Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations therefore decided
that a team inspection should be carried out to investigate these apparent
shortcomings in the control and supervision of operations.

A team comprising 11 NII inspectors and 2 inspectors from HSE's Field
Operations Directorate was assembled. In selecting the team, care was taken
to obtain a balance of inspectors with site inspection experience and
specialist knowledge in the areas to be inspected and also with experience
of inspection at both Sellafield and other nuclear establishments. In order
to maximise the time available for inspection on site, planning for the
inspection and examination of written information from BNFL was carried out
prior to commencing the on-site inspection activities. The team spent two
weeks on site in September 1999. Some members of the team also visited
BNFL's headquarters at Risley. Whilst on site, the team generally operated
as three groups (focusing on the topics of incidents, control and
supervision of operations, and staffing and resources), but regrouped where
appropriate to pursue central issues associated with the management of the
Sellafield site.

One Improvement Notice was served during the inspection requiring
improvements to BNFL's system for controlling risks to persons working at
heights. On another occasion BNFL voluntarily stopped a plant when serious
deficiencies were brought to its attention. BNFL has also agreed to
undertake a systematic assessment of the baseline resource levels it
requires for undertaking its current activities before any further changes
are made to its organisational structure.

The inspection confirmed NII's original concerns about control and
supervision. BNFL had already recognised a number of the shortcomings
identified during the course of this HSE team inspection. In particular, it
has recognised the need to bring about greater integration of the Sellafield
site under the management of a team with authority to manage operations on
the site and has begun to take steps to address this. It has also put in
place a programme of initiatives intended to improve safety in a number of
areas. Unless there are proactive systems for checking that the required
standards are being maintained, non-compliances are likely either to go
undetected, or to have caused significant problems by the time they are
detected.

There are three key conclusions from this inspection. The first is that
there is a lack of a high quality safety management system across the site
which is compounded by an overly complex management structure. The second is
that there are insufficient resources to implement even the existing safety
management system. The third is a lack of an effective independent
inspection, auditing and review system within BNFL. Without a vigorous
independent inspection, auditing and review system, HSE does not see how
BNFL can make acceptable and timely progress in delivering a high quality
safety management system across the site.

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An Investigation into the Falsification of Pellet Diameter Data in the MOX
Demonstration Facility at the BNFL Sellafield Site
and the Effect of this on the Safety of MOX Fuel in Use

by The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the HSE

FOREWORD

This report sets out the findings of the investigation carried out by HSE's
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate into the falsification of quality
assurance data associated with the production of MOX nuclear fuel pellets
manufactured in the MOX Demonstration Facility at Sellafield.

The investigation was carried out under the control of the Deputy Chief
Inspector responsible for regulating the safety at BNFL's sites. The
investigation began shortly after BNFL notified NII of suspected
falsification on 10 September.

It is the Executive's view that the report gives a thorough analysis of the
issues surrounding the falsification of quality assurance data at MDF. It is
clear that various individuals were engaged in falsification of important
records but a systematic failure allowed it to happen.

It has not been possible to establish the motive for this falsification, but
the poor ergonomic design of this part of the plant and the tedium of the
job seem to have been contributory factors. The lack of adequate supervision
has provided the opportunity. Despite this, self-discipline ought to have
ensured that those involved followed the proper procedures.

One point worth noting is that in the new Sellafield MOX Plant, currently
being commissioned, the inspection processes for MOX pellets, rods and
assemblies are designed to be almost fully automated: this should prevent
the falsification of data of the kind described in this report.

There are many lessons to learn, but the MOX Demonstration Facility is shut
down and will not be allowed to restart until NII is satisfied that the
recommendations in the report have been implemented.

If you have any comments, or would like further information on the issues
discussed in this report, write to the Chief Inspector at the following
address below:

 
Laurence Williams
Director of Nuclear Safety and HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations
Health & Safety Executive
St Peter's House
Stanley Precinct
Bootle L20 3LZ

SUMMARY

The MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) at BNFL's Sellafield site manufactures
MOX (mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium) fuel pellets and assembles these
using various customer supplied components to make complete fuel assemblies
for use in nuclear power reactors. Each fuel pellet produced passes through
a fully automated laser micrometer which checks and records the pellet's
diameter at three points along its length, giving a 100% automatic check on
all pellets used in a fuel rod. Any undersized or oversized pellets are
automatically rejected. Those which fall within the specified diametral
tolerance pass onto the next stage where each undergoes further visual
checks. As a confirmatory check on diameter and in accordance with the 1%
Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) criterion set out in BS 6001, a sample of 200
pellets (approximately 5%) which have passed through both these stages is
measured for a second time. This quality check is done using a similar
micrometer, but the sample pellets are presented to the micrometer by
process workers who type each measured diameter, e.g. 8.195mm, into a
computer spreadsheet.

On 20 August 1999 a member of MDF's Quality Control Team identified
similarities between the secondary pellet diameter data for successive Lots.
After further investigations, on 10 September 1999 BNFL reported to NII that
some of these secondary pellet diameter checks on the fuel manufactured for
a Japanese customer appeared to have been falsified by copying some data
between spreadsheets.

The Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII)
promptly launched an investigation to establish both the extent of the
falsification and the causes of the event. NII concluded that data had
indeed been falsified but that this would not affect the safety performance
of the fuel, given the automated primary diameter check on 100% of the
pellets used in each fuel rod.

NII believes the failure to properly carry out the agreed manual checks of
the pellet diameter to be a contractual issue between BNFL and its customer.
However, because it also represents a deliberate breach of operating
procedures the Inspectorate launched an investigation which centred upon:

1.understanding just what had occurred in MDF and why; 2.whether the fuel
involved will be safe in use; and 3.what needs to be done to prevent any
recurrence.

NII's investigation into possible reasons for the falsification identified
that although various individuals were at fault, a systematic failure
allowed it to happen. In a plant with the proper safety culture, the events
described in this report could not have happened.

NII commissioned an independent analysis by HSE's statisticians of the
extent of the falsification. The results of this and further manual checks
of data by NII showed that the initial investigation by BNFL, carried out
under severe time pressures was too narrow: there had been a tendency to
rush to early conclusions which understated the extent of the problem by
assuming that the falsification was largely confined to one shift.
Nevertheless BNFL agreed to carry out further, more detailed investigations
and, following discussions with NII, has taken steps to address the
contributory factors to this incident which the Company and the Inspectorate
have identified.

NII is satisfied that in spite of the falsification of the quality assurance
related data, the totality of the fuel manufacturing quality checks are such
that the MOX fuel produced for Japan will be safe in use. With regard to
MDF, the plant is shut down and will not be allowed to restart until NII is
satisfied that the recommendations outlined in this report have been
implemented to ensure, inter alia, that the deficiencies found in the
quality checking process have been rectified, the management of the plant
has been improved and plant operators have been either replaced or retrained
to bring the safety culture in the plant up to the standard NII requires for
a nuclear installation.

CONCLUSIONS

103. The events at MDF which have been revealed in the course of this
investigation could not have occurred had there been a proper safety culture
within this plant. It is clear that some process workers falsified records
of the diameter of fuel pellets taken for QA sampling. One example of
falsification has been found dating back to 1996. There can be no excuse for
process workers not following procedures and deliberately falsifying records
to avoid doing a tedious task. These people need to be identified and
disciplined. However, the management on the plant allowed this to happen,
and since it had been going on for over three years, must share
responsibility.

104. Before NII will allow the restart of MDF, BNFL will need to address all
the recommendations in the report to the Inspectorate's satisfaction.

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Summary of Events

On 20 August 1999 a member of the Quality Control Team in B33 MOX Demonstration Facility
(MDF) identified a similarity between mean pellet fuel diameter measurements reported on the QC
release certificates for the secondary sample checks of two successive Lots. These were discussed by
the QC Team in MDF on 23 August. Plant management was informed of these similarities on

25 August and the Shift Team Leaders were asked to pay particular attention to inspection of pellets
pending completion of QC release.

On 31 August BNFL's analysis of data for several Lots showed many of the mean pellet diameter
values in successive Lots to be the same, and the MDF QC management initiated a computerised
analysis of the data. Discussion with individuals concerned began on 1 September 1999. On 6
September the MOX Senior Team was informed that some falsification of data may have occurred.

On 3 September a process worker in MDF admitted deliberate falsification, and a second process
worker said that he was aware falsification was taking place. On 9 September the QC management updated the MDF Operations management on the results of the preliminary investigation. Over 9/10 September Trade Union officials met plant management with individuals concerned to try to understand the extent of the problem.

On 10 September the Independent Newspaper indicated to BNFL its intention to publish an article in

the newspaper concerning the fact that BNFL inspectors had falsified QC data on MOX pellet
diameter. The article was eventually published on 14 September.

On 10 September Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (the fuel vendor to Kansai) and NII were informed of
the situation. NII maintained contact with BNFL thereafter throughout the weekend until the beginning
of its on-site investigation. BNFL reported to NII that on 12 September 1999 it had found 11 Lots with
falsified data and 9 "unusual" Lots.

12 September: NII obtained BNFL's agreement not to restart production until NII had been notified.

NII was told that on 14 September the BNFL QC Team reported a further five sets of falsified data, and one further set of falsified data a day later. On 14 September NII began its on-site investigation into the incident.

14-16 September: Visit to the MDF plant by NII Site Inspector and NII Management to begin on-site
investigation into the event. This included some interviews.

On 16 September BNFL reported four further sets of falsified data and one additional unusual dataset
giving a total of 22 falsified datasets and 10 unusual datasets. On 16 September MDF Operations
Manager reported that BNFL believed that falsification of data had been undertaken principally by one
of the five shift teams.

20-21 September: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector and NII Senior Management. This included a
plant inspection and meeting with officials from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), Japan. NII told MITI that it would be carrying out a thorough independent analysis of the pellet
diameter data for Kansai.

21 September: NII wrote to the Japanese Embassy in London in response to a letter the previous day from the Economic Counsellor. The letter explained that it would "take some time, possibly several weeks, to check all of the data relating to the fuel which [was] currently en route to Japan". The letter also said that NII understood that BNFL had "already told the Japanese team visiting Sellafield that one Lot of MOX fuel pellets whose secondary sample checks on diameter show "unusual" results has been used in the manufacture of two fuel assemblies [then] currently en route to Fukui".

On 22 September at a meeting at NII's offices in Bootle, BNFL reported that its continuing
investigation had concluded that there were 22 falsified data Lots and one unusual data Lot. The other
nine 'unusual Lots' were eliminated by BNFL. All pellet Lots for which falsified datasets had been

reported had been used to produce fuel rods and assemblies for Takahama 3, and were still at
Sellafield. The pellets for an unusual Lot had been used to produce fuel rods in two of the eight fuel
assemblies for Takahama 4, which at that time were in the process of being transported to Japan.

22 September: HSE's independent statistical analysis of the pellet diameter data for Kansai was
initiated.

28-29 September: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector to conduct interviews with the Shift Team
Leaders (STLs), Shift Team Managers (STMs) and the Head of MDF Operations.

8 October: Visit to plant by NII Quality Assurance (QA) Specialist to investigate QA aspects of the event.

12-13 October: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector and Human Factors Specialist to discuss ergonomic
aspects of the event.

25-26 October: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector to witness three separate sets of dual 5% secondary
diameter checks.

29 October: The statistical analysis by HSE's EMSU of the data was completed.

3 November: An update provided by BNFL reported 22 falsified data Lots, one Lot having some
similarities with a previous Lot, one Lot having greater than normal number of pellets with three
identical diameters (ie cylindrical), and one Lot having a greater than normal number of identical pellets.

8 November: BNFL was informed that it would have to produce a safety case and seek NII's
agreement before it could restart MDF. NII wrote again to the Japanese Embassy confirming that
"two of the assemblies containing pellets with suspect data are in Japan." A copy of this letter was
placed in the House of Commons Library.

10 November: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector and an Inspector from the Radioactive Materials
Transport Division of the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) to discuss
BNFL countermeasures to prevent recurrence of the event.

11 November: A meeting took place between HSE and BNFL to discuss work necessary before MDF
is permitted to restart.

17 November: A meeting took place between HSE (NII and EMSU) and BNFL to discuss the findings
of HSE's statistical analysis of the secondary pellet diameter data. On the same day NII and BNFL
met to discuss BNFL's proposals for a safety case for the restart of operation in MDF.

23 November: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector to investigate ergonomics aspects of the event.

8-10 December: Visit to plant by NII Site Inspector and Human Factors specialist to undertake a
restart readiness inspection.

13 and 14 December: Meeting between NII and MITI officials to explain the results of HSE's
statistical analysis. NII confirmed the facts set out in earlier letters to the Japanese Embassy ie. that
two of the assemblies (MKP 005 and 006) in Japan contain pellets believed to have suspect data. HSE staff went to some lengths to explain that although the 8 November letter had used the word "suspect"
in relation to these assemblies, HSE considered that there was a vanishingly small probability of these
results [for Lots P783 and P824] having occurred by chance.

15 December: That evening BNFL reported to NII that following further investigation, data for a
further Lot, P814, had been found to be copied from a previous lot.

16 December: Following the discovery by BNFL of the additional falsified Lot, P814, NII asked for a further meeting with MITI which was held the same day. NII confirmed to MITI that P814 had been
falsified, and that this now meant that two further assemblies in Japan were considered to be affected.
Taken together with those assemblies identified previously, this now meant that a total of four
assemblies (MKP 005, 006, 007, and 008) out of the eight assemblies currently in Japan contained
pellets whose secondary diameter data was considered to have been falsified.

19 December: Visit to MDF by the Chief Inspector for a plant inspection.

20 December: BNFL Senior Management met with NII Senior Management at Bootle to discuss the
improvements which NII require to be implemented before permission to restart would be granted.

21 December: NII wrote to BNFL listing a number of areas for BNFL to address to NII's satisfaction before agreement to restart would be granted.

22 December: NII wrote to BNFL specifying under the nuclear site licence, that BNFL should
demonstrate to its Nuclear Safety Committee how it has satisfied itself that the lessons learned from
the MDF event will be disseminated to the rest of the site.

11 January 2000: NII met with BNFL to discuss the process which had been used to identify Lot P814
as containing falsified fuel pellet diameter data.

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NII report on High-Level Waste at Sellafield

SUMMARY

The storage of liquid High Level Waste (HLW) that results from the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, has at various
times been given a high profile by those concerned about the safety of operations at the Sellafield site of British Nuclear
Fuels plc (BNFL).

This report provides an update of the various issues raised in the NII's last report on the subject ("Safety of the
storage of liquid High Level Waste at BNFL Sellafield") produced in November 1995, summarises the latest NII
assessment of the B215 safety case and details progress against the key safety requirement in the 1995 report for BNFL
to reduce the stocks of liquid HLW to a buffer volume by around 2015. NII believes that there has to be a
demonstrable reduction in potential hazard (and hence risk) by reducing the amount of HLW stored as Highly Active
Liquor (HAL) and that the around 2015 date must therefore be achieved, as any shortfall will be publicly unacceptable.

The current 1994 safety case together with the additional information provided to NII in response to its issues, has
enabled the Inspectorate to make the judgement that the current and future operations of B215 are acceptably safe.
NII's assessment of the BNFL safety case identified concerns that the important engineering justification of the
B275 structures and systems was not presented in enough detail. There was too much emphasis on probabilistic
analysis in which numerical results were being used somewhat rigidly to make, rather than inform, decisions on whether
further work was needed. In addition, the analysis did not cover the full range of fault sequences.

BNFL is currently carrying out a safety case improvement programme to redress the balance between engineering
justification and risk analysis in its safety cases. The safety case for B215 is one of the early cases to be reviewed and
revised as part of this programme and a new safety case has just been submitted at the time of writing. It is intended that
an addendum to this report will be published in about a year's time when NII has assessed the revised safety case

The principal safety systems for B215 are those that maintain cooling and containment of the stored HAL.

Maintaining the integrity of cooling of the stored HAL is fundamental to the safety case. Although the HASTs have shown
some failures of cooling coils due to corrosion, NII has assessed BNFL's strategy for dealing with the problem and
is satisfied that sufficient cooling capability is, and will continue to be available. BNFL has upgraded the
cooling water pipework external to the HASTs, which adds to the system's reliability.

NII has also assessed the BNFL containment integrity arguments for the Highly Active Storage Tanks HASTs).
In respect of the ongoing ageing processes, primarily associated with corrosion, NII is satisfied that BNFL
understands and is controlling the mechanisms that could threaten the containment integrity. BNFL is currently
implementing a project (completion date 2000) to improve the HAST off-gas treatment systems that will further
reduce aerial discharges to the environment from the plant. BNFL has also completed additional seismic
damage assessments of B215 and implemented a programme of reasonably practicable improvements to increase
the plant's resistance to earthquake damage.

In response to issues on fire and explosion raised by NII, BNFL has carried out detailed analyses of the plant
and laboratory scale experimental work to show that adequate controls are in place to safeguard the plant from the
possible build-up of hydrogen and "Red Oil".

The declared position of NII and BNFL is that the HASTs should be emptied to a buffer stock and the HAL converted to a
solid form by around 2015. NII is monitoring BNFL's progress against this intent through reviewing actual
performance and predictions made using modelling techniques. Changes to the BNFL fuel reprocessing business, that
affect HAL arisings, are also accounted for in the NII assessment process.

NII is currently in the process of agreeing with BNFL a number of HAL limiting stock reduction curves against a
set of monitoring parameters together with a number of programme milestones, against which the HAST emptying policy
to a buffer stock will be regularly reviewed. NII intends to monitor BNFL's required progress at about 24 month
intervals and if this falls short of what was agreed will, using regulatory powers if necessary, require BNFL to take
actions, including reducing HAL arisings, to correct the situation within an agreed period of time.

Key to this process is agreeing the buffer stock to which the tanks will be emptied and which is necessary to allow control
of the feed to the vitrification process. BNFL has accepted an NII recommendation to conduct a full study
of options in order to agree the minimum buffer stocks. The objective of this study is the reduction of risk (harm potential) so far as is reasonably practicable as required by the HSAW Act 1974. It is NII intention to publish a further addendum to this report in about 12 to18 months when progress has been made with these studies.

The performance of the Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP) is a fundamental part of the process to
convert HAL to a solid form. WVP continues to experience operational difficulties with respect to achieving the
desired production rates, and the building of the third WVP process line is currently running late to the original
programme.

From the assessment of the data presented by BNFL on future HAL arisings and on the basis of the current
vitrification plant performance, NII remains to be convinced that BNFL will achieve the aim to reduce the stocks of
HAL to a buffer stock by 2015, unless:

(1) there is a significant increase in the throughput of the existing vitrification lines, and

(2) there is no further slippage in the third vitrification line coming on-stream, and

(3)the third fine meets its planned throughput targets,

Failure to achieve the above would leave BNFL with the following options to rectify the situation:

* Voluntarily reduce THORP throughput

* Close some Magnox generation capacity earlier than planned to reduce Magnox HAL arisings

* Construct additional vitrification plant capacity (Line 4).

The choice of which option to adopt would be a matter for the company and could involve some combination of the
above.

NII has made a number of recommendations in this report that need to be addressed by BNFL to ensure that
future B215 operations will continue to meet the requirement to control and reduce risks to as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP). The recommendations are made in the areas of plant and operations improvement,
safety case improvement, and the policy to reduce the quantity of HAL to a buffer stock by 2015. The recommendations in
this report have been forwarded to BNFL. It has recently responded to the first 17 recommendations. For the
majority of these recommendations BNFL has referred NII to their recently revised case, referred to as a Continued
Operations Safety Report, delivered to NII on 29.9.99. NII acknowledges that BNFL is currently carrying out work
against most of the recommendations, and this report serves to highlight the significance NII attaches to the
improvements. NII will be progressing with BNFL the necessary follow-up work to a satisfactory conclusion as part of its
normal regulatory duties conducted under the site licensing arrangements.

This review has shown that there is little or no slack in BNFL's programme of vitrification if the reduction in HALL to a
buffer stock, by the 2015 date, is to be maintained. NII notes that it has recently been repeated within the House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology (Ref 12) "that it would take until about 2015 to vitrify all the HLW in
stock." HSE will not hesitate to use its regulatory powers to ensure the HAL stock reduction, when agreed, is
achieved.

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Greenpeace demands shutdown not Modification of Mox NuclearFuel

Production After Regulator Details Safety Data

Falsification Continued for Four Years

LONDON, Feb 18, 2000 – The production of mixed uranium plutonium oxide (MOX)
fuel by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) at Sellafield in north-western England must
be scrapped by the British government following the release of a damning report by
the nuclear regulatory body, Greenpeace said today.

The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) report released today revealed that the
falsification of safety data for MOX fuel had gone on since 1996 and involved British
Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) major overseas clients, Japan and Switzerland. “The
appalling mismanagement of BNFL has destroyed not only the trust of their
Japanese clients, crucial to their survival, but also public faith in the British regulatory
system,” said Greenpeace International nuclear campaigner Shaun Burnie. “If BNFL
was not a taxpayer funded enterprise they would now be out of business.”

However BNFL and the NII continue to insist that the MOX fuel is safe to use, despite
the safety data falsification. This is despite the revelation last December that MOX
fuel produced by BNFL and loaded into a reactor in Switzerland, ruptured, leaked
radiation and had to be removed. MOX fuel, due to the presence of plutonium, is
widely considered less safe than conventional uranium fuel. Investigations last
September into BNFL MOX quality control standards concluded that it was practicably
impossible to assure the quality and therefore the safety of MOX fuel produced by
BNFL.(1)

“For the British nuclear regulator to continue to maintain that the MOX fuel is safe to
use in Japanese reactors, despite the safety data falsification, raises serious doubts
about its credibility,“ said Burnie. “The Japanese public are rightly sceptical of the
safety claims for the MOX fuel, which has led the Japanese government to demand
its return to the UK, this report will do nothing to reassure them.”

Greenpeace warned that the recommendations made by the NII for ‘modifications’ to
MOX production at Sellafield and retraining of staff will not address the industry’s
fundamental problems. “The British and Japanese governments must finally end the
folly of MOX production which cannot be justified on safety, economic or
environmental grounds and also poses a major nuclear weapons proliferation threat
in the volatile north-east Asian region. They must stop any further reprocessing and
abandon plans to open the doomed Sellafield MOX Plant,” said Burnie.

Currently the Nuclear Energy Agency estimates that making MOX costs 3 to 5 times
the cost of making uranium fuel, the standard fuel for the majority of nuclear reactors
around the world. The Sellafield nuclear facility discharges 3.3 billion litres of nuclear
waste each year in the Irish Sea.

The MOX plant at the centre of this scandal, the MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF),
received a £100 million upgrade in the early 1990’s, while at the same time, BNFL
proceeded with construction of the £300 million Sellafield MOX Plant. Ready for
operation in June 1997, the plant still remains idle, with the UK government
unprepared to open a plant that has almost no commercial contracts for MOX fuel
with foreign electrical utilities and British nuclear utilities have no plans to use MOX.

The BNFL/Japan MOX falsification scandal only became public after the Independent
newspaper revealed details last September. In the following three months, BNFL,
Kansai Electric, and the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry, MITI, continued to
deny that the scandal effected plutonium fuel newly arrived in Japan from the UK. The
fuel was due to be loaded into the Takahama reactor in Japan at the end of the year,
however BNFL was forced to admit that the MOX fuel contained ‘suspect’ quality
control data.

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BNFL Press Release

18 February 2000 - BNFL outlines forward action plan for

MOX fuel and Sellafield

BNFL today published its review of the secondary quality data problem
discovered within the MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) at Sellafield. The
review involved the senior non-Executive director and Chairman of BNFL's
audit committee, Mr John Roques. It details how the falsification occurred
and the remedial measures planned to ensure that such an event could not
happen again. A total of twenty two actions are grouped under the following
areas:

*Strengthening of supervision and leadership*Establishing a manufacturing
ethos and attitude*Improving the effectiveness of the Quality
Assurance/Quality Control compliance system*Re-establishing customer
confidence in BNFL's MOX fuel*Re-establishing Government and regulatory
confidence in BNFL's MOX fuel*Reviewing and revising our forward business
strategy

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has also published its own report on
the events in MDF. BNFL has taken HSE's recommendations on board and is
already implementing an action plan which will systematically address them.
Indeed, the HSE's first recommendation that the recording of the secondary
quality data should be automated has already been incorporated within the
Company's immediate plans.

The HSE's report also systematically addresses the question of whether the
data falsification could have affected the safety of the fuel. HSE's view is
that from a technical viewpoint, the extensive checks performed at all
stages of fuel production - both before and after the stage at which some
falsification occurred - mean that the fuel would be safe in use.

BNFL Chief Executive John Taylor and Chris Loughlin, the BNFL Board director
responsible for MOX business are this week in Japan meeting with customers.

Commenting on the review published today, John Taylor said: "We deeply
regret these events and the problems that they have caused for our
customers. We now need to get on with implementing the action plan and
restoring our credibility."

A further two reports have also been published today by HSE relating to a
team inspection of the Sellafield site conducted in September last year and
a review of progress in reducing quantities of liquid high level waste
stored at Sellafield.

Commenting on all of the reports which have been issued today, John Taylor
said: "Taken together the four reports published today provide a valuable
input to the change programme we are implementing throughout the Company.
The reports acknowledge that we have made a good start and they also point
out areas where we still have much to do. I look forward to working with our
customers and our regulators to achieve our vision of world class standards
in safety and plant operations."

HSE NII Team Inspection

BNFL has a Sellafield site action plan underway in order to address many of
the recommendations in this report and the Company will continue to work
with the regulator in reviewing progress against an agreed plan which
addresses all of the recommendations. Taken as a whole, this examination of
the management, control and supervision of operations, staffing and
incidents should give reassurance to BNFL's employees, the local community,
customers and the general public that the site is being run in a safe and
secure manner.

Commenting on this report, Brian Watson, Head of the Sellafield Site, said:
"We have to remember that nobody is saying that Sellafield is unsafe. Safety
is, and will always be our number one priority and the independent rigour
which the HSE applies to our own standards is a key element in our
continuing drive to achieve world class safety."

BNFL will use the findings of the Team Inspection to build upon the safety
improvements already achieved at Sellafield. These include:

*A three-fold reduction in the average employee radiation dose between 1988
and 1998 to the point where today, the average Sellafield worker receives an
occupational dose which is nearly half that of the average airline crew.
*Radioactive discharges to sea are now less than 1% of their peak levels in
the 1970s, due to an investment of more than £2 billion in waste management
and effluent treatment facilities over the last ten years.*The number of
radiological incidents at Sellafield has remained broadly the same over the
last ten years, against the background of an increasing workload and scope
of activities at Sellafield including decommissioning and clean up.*Last
year, the Sellafield site was awarded a total of seventeen RoSPA Awards,
whilst the number of lost time accidents at Sellafield has reduced ten-fold
over the last ten years.*In September last year BNFL, in partnership with
the trade unions, successfully introduced a new employee contract across the
Sellafield site and the Company. The contract is widely recognised as being
amongst the most advanced in the world. *Specifically, the new contract
encourages more flexible working and will be a key element in the whole site
pulling together to achieve the operational changes needed.

Progress in reducing high level waste

BNFL welcomes the HSE's independent verification of safety at the liquid
high level waste storage facility and their continuing view that it is
acceptably safe. The report makes a total of twenty two recommendations, of
which the first seventeen have already been addressed as part of the revised
safety case which was delivered to HSE, as agreed in September 1999. The
remaining five recommendations relate to longer term reviews and studies of
an ongoing nature which will be progressed in the coming months and years.

BNFL notes the HSE's comments on progress in reducing the amount of liquid
waste in storage and remains confident that the target date of 2015 for the
vitrification of all but buffer levels of liquid waste will be met. A number
of operating difficulties during the early years of the vitrification plant
delayed progress in working through this backlog, however these have now
been resolved and plant throughput has improved in recent years. The Company
is now commissioning a new vitrification line which will further increase
throughput. Lessons learnt in operating the original two lines have been
incorporated into the third line, which is scheduled to start operations
later this year.

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Briefing from Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment

98 Church St, Barrow, Cumbria LA14 2HJ.
Tel 01229 833851. Fax 01229 812239
e.mail: info@core.furness.co.uk

Subject: Sellafield Update: MOX, Site Safety, High Level Waste, Prosecution.

Friday 18th February 2000 must be recorded as the blackest day in BNFL's 30 year chequered history, with the publication of three damning reports by the Health & Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Publication of the reports, coinciding with BNFL executives' last-ditch attempts to patch up the company's shattered MOX relationship with Japanese customers, has brought combined criticism of the Company from all quarters including the UK Government.

MOX falsification scandal:

NII's report, published one week after their Director of Nuclear Safety had been to Japan to explain the findings to the Japanese Government and Industry, concludes that a systematic management failure allowed individuals to falsify quality assurance records for MOX pellet measurements. Their investigation at the small MOX Demonstration Facility (MDF) at Sellafield found that 31 Lots of MOX pellets (around 4000 pellets per Lot) had been subject of data falsification since 1996. The affected Lots included those made up into fuel assemblies and already shipped to Japan in 1999. Earlier shipments to Switzerland (Beznau) and Germany (Unterweser) were also affected.

The investigation by the NII considered three possible types of data falsification. 1. Copying a whole spreadsheet and replacing some data entries, 2. Copying whole rows of three data entries within a spreadsheet (the three diameter readings for one pellet) and 3. Other manipulation and invention. A majority of the falsifications found came under category 1 and related to the secondary manual check carried out by workers on a randomly selected 200 pellets from each Lot of 4000.

NII were unable to establish a motive for the falsification, but suggested a combination of poor ergonomic design of the plant, the tedium of the job or the ease with which the computer data logging system could be manipulated. Currently closed down, MDF will not be permitted by NII to restart production until 'deficiencies found in the quality checking process have been rectified, the management of the plant improved and the operators either replaced or retrained to bring the safety culture in the plant up to the standards the Health & Safety Executive requires for a nuclear installation'.

Since MDF started operating in 1993, 6 consignments of MOX fuel (a total of 36 assemblies) have been delivered to overseas customers. Of these 6 consignments, four have now been found to have contained either falsified quality assurance data or faulty fuel. In 1998, faulty MOX fuel rods were returned to Sellafield by the operators of the Swiss Beznau power station.

BNFL's poor management of MDF and their dishonesty about data falsification has been roundly condemned by UK Government which has already had to send a high level team of Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) officials to Japan to apologise to their counterparts. Energy Minister Helen Liddell has described BNFL's behaviour as completely unacceptable and has called for a 'root and branch' review of BNFL management. DTI's Secretary of State Stephen Byers has highlighted funadamental flaws in BNFL management. Calls for senior management heads to roll by both Liddell and Byers have been widely echoed in all strands of the British media. Sellafield's local MP Jack Cunningham has called for sackings up to Boardroom level.

Five shopfloor workers have been dismissed by BNFL since the MOX scandal came to light last September. The three workers originally sacked have lodged a claim for unfair dismissal with an Industrial Tribunal. The other two workers are still persuing their case through the company's internal disciplinary system. Represented by the GMB trades union, all five workers consider they have been scapegoated by BNFL, and the NII report's crticism of systematic management failure has brought renewed calls from workers and others that some managers and even members of the BNFL Board, including the Chief Executive John Taylor, should now be sacked.

BNFL's future MOX business now hangs in the balance as the Japanese Government and Industry decide whether or not to continue dealing with BNFL as a supplier of MOX. This may take many months and is likely to delay even further any UK Government's decision on BNFL's new Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP), already delayed for three years. Ministers' uncertainties as to the viability of SMP will have deepened as a result of the current fiasco, and they will be assessing the likely knock-on effect on existing customers in Germany and Switzerland . The ultimate humiliation for BNFL will be the Japanese Government's insistence that the MOX fuel shipped to Japan last year, and subject to falsification, be returned to Sellafield at BNFL's cost. Such a shipment, requiring prior approval of the United States and others, would have to be undertaken by BNFL's converted gunboats against a tide of international condemnation.

Sellafield Safety Audit - NII team Inspection.

Following an increase in accidents and events at Sellafield in early 1999, NII inspectors carried out a three week inspection of Sellafield last September (see CORE Briefing 14/99). Their findings were published last Friday along with their MOX investigation report.

In their main conclusions, NII highlights the lack of a high quality safety management system on the site, and also the lack of sufficient resources to implement such a system. NII was also highly critical of the standard of safety documentation at the plant and, as a result of efforts to make the company attractive for privatisation, the fact that managers were having to divert as much as 50% of their time from operational matters - adversely affecting plant safety.

Making 28 recommendations to improve safety throughput the site and at all levels of the workforce, NII have given BNFL 2 months in which to produce a programme of response to the recommendations.. Laurence Williams, for NII, has said that control and supervision of operations at Sellafield is of paramount importance and NII will use its regulatory powers to ensure that the company implements the report's recommendations to reverse the decline in safety performance at the site. Should progress be inadequate, NII would not hesitate to use its enforcement powers, including closing down the site.

High Level Liquid Wastes at Sellafield.

In the third report to have been published last Friday, NII has published its updated safety review of BNFL's management of HLW at Sellafield. NII's first Review was published in 1995. Inspectors remain critical of the apparent inability by BNFL to treat the backlog of High Level Wastes, stored in a number of tanks, which result from Sellafield's reprocessing operations (see CORE Briefing 13/99).

The wastes are accumulating faster than BNFL is able to deal with them at Sellafield's Vitrification Plant, where the liquid is turned into glass. There is currently around 1300 cubic metres of HLW at Sellafield.The Vitrification Plant currently has two operating production lines, both of which have significantly underperformed. A third production line is due to open at the end of this year and with all three lines operating BNFL plans to catch up with the backlog of which the NII is so critical. Despite previous threats from the NII, BNFL's programme has remained behind target and NII has again threatened that they will stop reprocessing operations at Sellafield if BNFL's vitrification performance does not improve.

NII are requiring BNFL to reduce stocks of liquid HLW to a 'buffer' quantity - the minimum required for safe and efficient operation. This reduction is to be completed by around 2015 .

Prosecution.

As a final blow on the blackest of Fridays for BNFL, NII announced that the Company was to be prosecuted for an incident at Sellafield in March last year when two workers received burns following a spill of nitric acid in Sellafield's newly built Solvent Treatment Plant (see CORE Briefing 5/99). The œ60m plant treats the backlog of acid used historically in reprocessing operations. The prosecution is expected to take place this Spring.

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BNFL can't be trusted say Friends of the Earth

Commenting on the scandal over the falsification of plutonium data by
BNFL, Mark Johnson, Energy campaigner at Friends of the Earth said:

"This scandal leaves the business case for the new large-scale MOX plant
in tatters. John Prescott now has no option but to reject BNFL's application to
operate the plant. It would be foolish, and probably illegal, for the
Deputy PM to give the go-ahead after this shameful episode.

This whole affair shows, once again, that BNFL cannot be trusted and
that the economic and environmental madness of reprocessing must not be
allowed to continue.

The nuclear industry does have a future, but this lies with clean-up and
decommissioning. This will provide long-term jobs and safeguard the
environment for future generations as well as securing a stake for
Britain in dealing with the mess that the nuclear industry has created
worldwide."

For more information see www.foe-scotland.org.uk/

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MOX problems also in Germany

There have been calls for the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate to release all information and data relating to
the falsification of safety data of nuclear fuel by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) which was sent to Germany.

Greenpeace understand that 4 assemblies of plutonium uranium oxide (MOX) fuel are loaded in the Unterweser reactor, in northern Germany (the only German plant using BNFL plutonium fuel). The fuel was shipped on the
roll-on-roll off cargo vessel, Arneb in October 1996. It is estimated to contain around 100-120kg of plutonium, plus approximately 2 tons of uranium.

The disclosure that BNFL nuclear fuel safety scandal extends to Germany follows recent British government answers to parliamentary questions that revealed that nuclear fuel with falsified safety data had also been sent
to Switzerland in 1997 where it was loaded into the Beznau nuclear reactor. In separate incident another batch of BNFL MOX ruptured in the same reactor in 1997. The operator removed the fuel after detecting abnormal levels of radiation.

The confirmation of the falsification of MOX fuel sent to Germany was contained in a reference in the UK government's report on MOX falsification released Friday, that MOX fuel produced in 1996 contained falsified quality control data(1).

BNFL only produced MOX fuel for Germany in 1996. However the report failed to provide details of MOX fuel
provided to Switzerland and Germany, instead it concentrated on fuel manufactured for Japanese client, Kansai Electric.

All three client countries of BNFL’s MOX Demonstration Facility - Japan, Germany and Switzerland - have received plutonium fuel that is not safe to use due to vital quality control checks having been missed. Kansai Electric has abandoned plans to use the 8 fuel assemblies now in Japan, and is demanding their return to Britain.

“This is further damning evidence against BNFL’s plutonium business, as well as the UK and German authorities”, said Simon Boxer of Greenpeace International. “For almost four months BNFL denied that that plutonium fuel shipped to Japan had been falsified, the UK regulators have so far failed to provide any details on either Swiss or German falsification. The
German authorities have apparently made insufficient checks, telling Greenpeace only last week that everything was normal,” said Boxer.

“All of the relevant quality control data for MOX produced for Germany, and Switzerland, must be publicly released so that it can be independently scrutinized,” said Boxer. “The nuclear industry and the regulators cannot be trusted to do a thorough job.”

Greenpeace contacted the German authorities last week in Lower Saxony which oversee the Unterweser reactor. They stated that they had been informed by the reactor's operator, electrical utility PreussenElektra, about the data falsification problem last autumn. The Lower Saxony authorities stated to Greenpeace that they had looked at the fuel data and found no anomalies.

Before closing its own MOX fuel production plants, Germany produced MOX fuel at the small Hanau plant which was closed in 1995 after a series of accidents. A new 1.1 billion German marks MOX plant at the same site never became operational due to environmental opposition.

BNFL Press Release - BNFL MOX Fuel In Germany

21st February 2000

Since the incidence of falsification of secondary pellet diameter measurements in Japanese fuel came to light, BNFL has
conducted an investigation of all quality data relating to German fuel. The customer has seen the results of this investigation and
done his own audit. Both BNFL and our German customer have concluded that the fuel manufactured for Germany meets the
specification and this is borne out by the fact that it has been performing satisfactorily in the reactor for nearly three years.

One case of 'falsification' was found, which occurred when an individual inadvertently deleted a set of data, and copied a set of
previous data to save repeating the work.

BNFL has carried out further checks on data for MOX fuel supplied to Germany. These checks applied the same methodology which brought to light the additional falsifications in the Japanese fuel. This additional analysis has revealed no further evidence of falsification, apart from the incident mentioned above. BNFL's investigation showed that the secondary diameter measurements for this pellet lot had been properly taken and the lot met the acceptance standard.

Media Affairs
21 February 2000.

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